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A BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION FRAMEWORK FOR SERIES
LLC ELIGIBILITY, PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE, AND
SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION
ABSTRACT
The Series LLC is one of the more novel business entities available to
entrepreneurs. Not only does it limit the liability of its members, but it also limits
the liability between different business endeavors. Such multi-directional
liability protection was previously only afforded to the creative business owner
who formed a family of individual limited liability entities.
While the Series LLC sounds appealing in theory, there are several
concerns. The first concern is whether the Series LLC is eligible for bankruptcy.
The second concern stems from the fact that the limited liability protecting
different business endeavors is untested in bankruptcy courts. A final concern is
that the multi-directional limited liability of the Series LLC may frustrate the
federal bankruptcy policy seeking to distribute assets to creditors promptly and
equitably.
This Comment responds to these concerns by presenting a bankruptcy
litigation framework that answers the question of bankruptcy eligibility and
describes how parties in interest may skillfully evade some of the limited liability
that entrepreneurs exploit with the Series LLC; thus, leveling the playing field
and furthering federal bankruptcy policy.
INTRODUCTION
In America’s infancy, states recognized the corporate instrument with a
heightened level of suspicion and fear.1 Much of this fear could be attributed to
the corporation’s perpetual life and its ability to absorb vast amounts of capital.2
As such, states generally only granted individual corporate charters when they
were necessary to achieve an otherwise unattainable community need.3 But as
states’ desires for business expansion grew, general corporate laws emerged to
satisfy the insatiable appetite for more corporate charters.4 Even after the
creation of general corporate laws, fears of the corporate structure remained

1
2
3
4

See generally Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548–65 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See generally id.
See generally id.
See generally id.
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prevalent and charters were severely limited.5 For many years, general corporate
laws restricted the amount of capital a corporation could raise, the amount of
debt a corporation could undertake, and the scope of activities a corporation
could perform.6 At the turn of the twentieth century, however, lesser developed
states began jockeying for new revenue by removing safeguards from their
general corporate laws in an effort to invite persons from other states to
incorporate.7
Jump ahead 100 years, and the consequences of state jockeying are clear:
corporate restrictions have drastically diminished across America. Even
industrialized states, such as New York, lost bargaining power since requiring a
higher bar was futile when foreign incorporation was able to circumvent local
restrictions.8 Following the decay of corporate restrictions, states had to come
up with new, creative mechanisms to attract business formation. The first, and
most notable, innovation in business entity law was the creation of the Limited
Liability Company (“LLC”), which combined limited liability, previously only
afforded to corporations, and flow-through taxation, historically reserved for
partnerships.9
Since the genesis of the LLC, one of the more recent developments has been
the creation of the Series Limited Liability Company (“Series LLC” or “SLLC”).
The Series LLC offers its members dynamic, multi-directional liability
protection in a single, neat and tidy package. Members benefit from the
administrative convenience of owning one company and the liability protections
only achievable by owning a family of separate business entities, while
minimizing tax obligations. With such increased protection afforded to business
owners, one cannot help but wonder whether the states’ interest in attracting
business is on a collision course with federal bankruptcy policies.
Federal bankruptcy law has two overarching principles.10 The first is to
promote the prompt and equal distribution of assets among similarly situated
creditors.11 The second is to grant a fresh start to the honest but unfortunate

5

See generally Louis K. Liggett Co., 288 U.S. at 548–65 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See generally id.
7
See generally id.
8
See id. at 560–63.
9
See generally THOMAS A. HUMPHREYS, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES AND LIMITED LIABILITY
PARTNERSHIPS § 1.01 (2018).
10
ROBERT E. GINSBERG, ROBERT D. MARTIN & SUSAN V. KELLEY, GINSBERG & MARTIN ON
BANKRUPTCY § 1.01[H] (5th ed. 2018).
11
Id.
6
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debtor.12 These overarching principles are commonly referred to as the “twin
pillars” of bankruptcy law.13
The twin pillars of bankruptcy law, however, are not infallible. State law
may have the capacity to frustrate the aims of the twin pillars when federal
bankruptcy law does not displace state law.14 This is the conundrum presented
by the relatively new business entity: the Series LLC.
The Series LLC offers more liability protection in one business entity than
any entity ever before created. Because the Series LLC is an adaptation of the
limited liability company, its members benefit from both flow-through taxation
and limited liability. Limited liability in this context refers to the managers’
protection from business liability, which can be thought of as the “vertical
limited liability shield.”15 But the Series LLC’s protections do not stop there. It
also provides “horizontal limited liability shields,”16 which separate individual
business ventures, called “protected series,” from one another,17 and
consequently impede liability from flowing amongst the various ventures. The
manager of a Series LLC may create as many protected series under its operating
agreement as it sees fit, each with its own business purpose.18 Thus, a Series
LLC can stop liability from flowing both horizontally across the company and
vertically to the members. Before the inception of the Series LLC, the only way
to achieve such a complex limited liability scheme was to create multiple,
individual corporations or LLCs. In essence, the Series LLC allows risk averse
entrepreneurs to maximize protections and minimize administrative time and
costs.

Despite the prospect of limiting liability even further, two primary
uncertainties surrounding Series LLCs have frustrated entrepreneurs and
business owners from embracing the Series LLC as a preferred business
entity.19 The first is the uncertainty of whether the state-promised limited
liability afforded by a protected series will survive in a federal bankruptcy
12

GINSBERG, MARTIN & KELLEY, supra note 10.
Id.
14
See generally Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (Federal courts in bankruptcy should
follow state law if federal policy does not require a different result); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78
(1938) (“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied
in any case is the law of the State.”).
15
See UNIF. PROTECTED SERIES ACT, Prefatory Note at 2–3, 2–12 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215(a) (2016).
19
MARK A. SARGENT & WALTER D. SCHWIDETZKY, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY HANDBOOK § 2:12,
(September 2015).
13
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case.20 This uncertainty exists because states conceived the Series LLC and its
protected series after the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) was enacted,21
consequently, commentators disagree over whether the Series LLC, the
protected series or either may qualify as a debtor under the Code.22 The second
uncertainty is judiciary in nature: courts have yet to adjudicate whether the
horizontal limited liability shields are robust enough to withstand an attack from
creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding.
This Comment addresses bankruptcy concerns surrounding the Series LLCs
by providing a bankruptcy litigation framework. While commentators have
appropriately raised concerns and questions about the Series LLC,23 none have
offered answers. For three reasons, now is the ideal time to confront these
bankruptcy concerns. First, Series LLC adoption is becoming sufficiently
widespread for the question to be relevant—evidence suggests there are at least
1,500 protected series filed in Delaware and over 26,000 filed in Illinois.24
Second, the adoption of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Protected
Series Act in July 2017 (“ULLCPSA” or “UPSA”)25 offers the hope of a
consistent Series LLC legal landscape that will make a uniform analytical
framework more plausible. And finally, the Series LLC entity has been in
existence long enough to increase the likelihood that bankruptcy courts will
begin adjudicating the issues previously raised.
Before delving into the proposed bankruptcy framework, it is important to
briefly mention that American litigation is fundamentally adversarial in nature.26
As such, judges are generally reactive and will rarely intervene without request

20
See Kurz v. AMCP-1, LLC, 2016 Md. App. LEXIS 647, at *20– 21 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 10, 2016)
(citing SARGENT & SCHWIDETZKY, supra note 19).
21
Limited Liability Companies—Domestic and Foreign Companies—Registration and Regulation, 1996
Del. Laws 360, H.B. 528 (1996); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codified
as amended at 11 U.S.C. (1994)).
22
Compare Amanda J. Bahena, Series LLCs: The Asset Protection Dream Machines?, 35 J. CORP. L.
799, 808 (2010) (A SLLC cannot be a debtor) with Shannon L. Dawson, Series LLC and Bankruptcy: When the
Series Finds Itself in Trouble, Will it Need its Parent to Bail it Out?, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 515, 515–17 (2010) (A
SLLC can be a debtor).
23
See e.g., Carol R. Gofarth, The Series LLC, and a Series of Difficult Questions, 60 ARK. L. REV. 385,
401–03 (2007); Jennifer Avery, et. al., Series LLCs: Nuts and Bolts, Benefits and Risks, and the Uncertainties
That Remain, 45 TEX. J. BUS. L. 9 (2012).
24
UNIF. PROTECTED SERIES ACT §§ 301–05 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
25
Jay Adkisson, Uniform Limited Liability Company Protected Series Act (ULLCPSA) Adopted by
Uniform Law Commission, FORBES (Oct. 7, 2017, 11:29 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2017/
07/22/uniform-limited-liability-company-protected-series-act-ullcpsa-adopted-by-uniform-lawcommission/#6faf71673253.
26
RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE 10–11, 541–671 (7th ed. 2016).
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by the parties.27 Thus, a bankruptcy court will generally not decide sua sponte
on whether the debtor is eligible or whether limited liability can be
circumvented. Indeed, the responsibility is on the parties in interest to take
action. The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure govern all procedural
aspects of a bankruptcy case.28 Litigation proceedings in a bankruptcy case can
be divided into two categories: (i) contested matters; and (ii) adversary
proceedings.29 Contested matters are initiated by filing a motion, whereas
adversary proceedings are initiated by filing a complaint.30 The matter being
disputed will generally dictate which type of proceeding is initiated. Because the
Series LLC presents novel issues, this Comment adds value by not merely
providing the substantive standards necessary to address the issues, but also by
putting them in context of the most effective procedural posture.
The bankruptcy litigation framework introduced by this Comment identifies
the procedural posture and the substantive standards for a party in interest to: (i)
dispute either a Series LLC’s or a protected series’ eligibility; and (ii) evade
horizontal limited liability shields by expanding the reach of property of the
estate.
For a party in interest to dispute a Series LLC’s or a protected series’
bankruptcy eligibility, the party must move to dismiss in accordance with
Federal Bankruptcy Rule 9014.31 The moving party must predicate the dismissal
under the substantive “for cause” standard.32 Although the Code does not define
“cause,” section III.A of this Comment asserts that failing to satisfy the
eligibility requirements under Code § 109 constitutes sufficient “cause” to
dismiss a Series LLC or protected series bankruptcy case. On the one hand, a
court will likely hold that a Series LLC categorically satisfies the Code’s
threshold eligibility requirement. On the other hand, however, an interested
party may find success in moving to dismiss a protected series. This Comment
asserts that the determinative question is whether the enabling statute explicitly
recognizes the protected series as a separate juridical entity. In other words:
Whether the statute allows for the protected series to be a lone party in a judicial
dispute. As discussed later in this Comment, for a court to find that a protected

27

Id.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001.
29
In re Kempner, 152 B.R. 37, 40 (D. Del. 1993) (citing HARVEY M. LEBOWITZ, BANKRUPTCY
DESKBOOK, 721 (2d ed. 1990)).
30
Id.
31
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1017(f).
32
See 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2018) (dismissal and conversion “for cause” in a chapter 7 case); see
§ 1112(b)(1) (dismissal and conversion “for cause” in a chapter 11 case).
28

MCELHINNEY COMMENT_PROOFS

156

1/14/2019 9:00 AM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 35

series is a separate juridical entity, it must have the power to sue and be sued in
addition to the other common powers the protected series are afforded.33
Section III.B of this Comment identifies two claims that a party in interest
may file to circumvent limited liability. Both require the claimant to initiate
adversary proceedings under Rule 7001 to dispute the ownership of assets held
by a nondebtor protected series.34 Under both adversary proceedings, the dispute
concerns property of the estate. In turn, state law defines the extent of property
interests. There are two legal theories that the claimant may assert to expand
property of the estate beyond what is initially held by the debtor protected series.
First, a claimant may seek property from a nondebtor protected series that fails
to satisfy the enabling statute’s formalities. This first attack is premised on the
notion that a protected series benefits from limited liability only if it has satisfied
the enabling statute’s formalities. If any protected series fails to meet the
statutory formalities, then its property is up for grabs. Second, a claimant may
pursue additional property through veil piercing. Under this second analysis, a
protected series’ limited liability might be pierced to achieve equitable
results⎯regardless of whether it satisfied statutory formalities.
Section III.C of this Comment identifies a contested matter under Rule 9014
where the party in interest may move for substantive consolidation. Here, the
court will determine if federal interests warrant aggregating the assets and
liabilities of the Series LLC and its protected series. Substantive consolidation
is an equitable remedy, originating from federal common law, that courts use to
create a single survivor entity from the aggregation of assets and liabilities of
separate legal entities.35 The application of substantive consolidation turns on
the prevailing analysis in each jurisdiction. If substantive consolidation
considerations are persuasive, then the court may dissolve any horizontal limited
liability shields separating protected series from one another and the Series LLC
itself.
I.

BACKGROUND

The series limited liability company is ultimately a more capable form of the
traditional limited liability company. To fully understand the added capabilities

33
See Alphonse v. Arch Bay Holding, LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 822, at *7–18 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2013),
rev’d, 548 Fed. App’x 979 (5th Cir. 2013), remanded, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163963 (E.D. La. Nov. 24, 2014),
aff’d, 618 F. App’x 765 (5th Cir. 2015); see also GxG Mgmt. LLC v. Young Bros. and Co., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12337, at *17–21 (D. Me. Feb. 21, 2007).
34
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(2) (to determine the validity, priority, or extent of an interest in property).
35
In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 205 (3d Cir. 2005).
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of the SLLC, one needs to first understand the LLC because its features and
capabilities are also present in the SLLC.
A. A Brief History of the Limited Liability Company
In the U.S., before 1977, a group of entrepreneurs basically had two options
when forming a company: corporation or partnership.36 A corporation is a
separate entity that exists independently of the individuals composing it,37 has
distinct rights from those of its members, and protects its shareholders from its
liabilities.38 Importantly, because corporations exist independently, they are
taxed individually.39 In contrast, a partnership is a dependent entity that requires
at least two or more partners and ceases to exist if any one partner withdrawals.40
Because a partnership is a dependent business organization, it avoids any
taxation against “itself”41 and its liabilities flow through to each partner.42
Since 1977, limited liability companies have dramatically changed the
landscape of business entities.43 LLCs borrow characteristics from corporations
and partnerships.44 A business formed as an LLC affords its owners the benefits
of flow through taxation, historically reserved for partnerships, and protects
them from business liabilities, a benefit generally limited to corporate entities.45
Effectively, the LLC provides a statutory solution that allows the business
owners to have their cake and eat it too.
The initial adoption of the LLC as a viable business organization was slow,
despite its statutory benefits, until the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) took an
affirmative position in 1988 on how it would tax LLCs.46 In Revenue Ruling 8876, the IRS made a binding decision to permit LLCs to qualify as partnerships
36
Wyoming was the first state to enact limited liability company legislation in 1977. SARGENT & WALTER
SCHWIDETZKY, supra note 19, at § 1.2 (2017), This hypothetical choice assumes the members want to retain the
right to actively participate in the management of the business. It is noted that limited partnerships have been
around for a few hundred years. However, limited partners are restricted in their right to control certain business
functions.
37
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 5 (2017).
38
Id. at § 14.
39
Id. at § 40.
40
J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, PARTNERSHIP LAW & PRACTICE: GENERAL AND
LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS §§ 2.3, 3.8 (2017).
41
Id. at § 3.8.
42
Id. at § 2.3.
43
See HUMPHREYS, supra note 9 (“Since its introduction . . . the LLC has become the entity of choice in
the United States for non-publicly traded business and investment enterprises.”).
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
SARGENT & SCHWIDETZKY, supra note 19, at § 1.2.
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for tax purposes.47 After this ruling, LLC statutes “spread like wildfire across
the United States.”48 By 1996, some form of an LLC statute had been enacted in
every state;49 and by 2007, new domestic LLC formations were outpacing new
domestic corporation formations at a factor of nearly 2:1.50
At the time of its creation, the LLC blurred the lines between corporation
and partnership by combining flow through taxation51 with a vertical limited
liability shield that protects its owners from liabilities of the company.52 In doing
so, it provided its owners added benefits, but also opened the door to uncertainty.
Only after the tax uncertainty was addressed did the LLC’s popularity grow.
Similarly, the SLLC also blurs the lines between corporation and partnership.
The SLLC maintains the flow through taxation and vertical limited liability
shield that the traditional LLC created, and adds horizontal limited liability
shields to protect assets in one part of the company from liabilities in another.53
This latest evolution in business entities provides a new means for business
owners to mitigate risks, the results of which were previously only reached by
having multiple companies in a parent-subsidiary relationship. But like LLCs
before it, the new SLLCs pose unprecedented questions—particularly in
bankruptcy since the IRS has already addressed that it would tax the SLLC the
same as an LLC.54 Because of the similarities between LLCs and SLLCs, section
III.A explains how analyzing the way courts treated LLCs in bankruptcy offers
valuable insight into how the courts will treat SLLCs in bankruptcy.
B. Introducing the Series Limited Liability Company
In 1996 Delaware passed the first legislation for a series limited liability
company.55 The enabling statute provides that an LLC agreement may assign
members, managers, interests, or assets into designated series.56 In turn, each
designated series may be allocated separate rights, powers, or duties from other
series or the LLC generally. Importantly, the “debts, liabilities, obligations and
47

HUMPHREYS, supra note 9, at § 1.03.
Id.
49
Id.
50
Rodney D. Christman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill: An Empirical Study of the Number of New
LLCs, Corporations and LPs Formed in the United States Between 2004–2007 and How LLCs Were Taxed for
Years 2002–2006, 15 FORDHAM J. OF CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 478 (2009).
51
HUMPHREYS, supra note 9.
52
See UNIF. PROTECTED SERIES ACT, Prefatory Note at 2-3 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
53
Id.
54
Series LLCs and Cell Companies, 75 Fed. Reg. 55,699, 55,704 (proposed Sept. 14, 2010) (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301).
55
6 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215 (2016).
56
§ 18-215(a).
48
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expenses incurred, contracted for or otherwise existing with respect to a
particular series shall be enforceable against the assets of such series only, and
not against the assets of the limited liability company generally or any other
series thereof . . . .”57
Because the series is created under the LLC agreement,58 its members retain
the advantages of the traditional vertical limited liability shield.59 The principal
benefit of creating a series is that each series has separate assets and liabilities
enforceable only against itself,60 thus, risk from one business endeavor is
quarantined from other business endeavors, effectively creating horizontal
limited liability shields that limit the reach liability may have across a
company.61
The legal fiction of the SLLC allows a business owner to segregate company
risks with very little additional consideration. For example, consider how a taxi
cab business with 10 cabs could be organized. As a SLLC, the business could
create 10 protected series, each holding a cab and employing a driver. This
organization would shield liabilities of one cab, e.g., damages stemming from a
negligent accident, from flowing out to the rest of the company. Alternatively,
to achieve the same horizontal limited liability without a SLLC organization, the
business would need to be organized into 10 separate LLCs, each holding a cab
and employing a driver. This business organization would safely achieve a
similar result as the SLLC organization, but it is costlier because it requires 10
articles of organization, 10 operating agreements and 10 state filings. An
entrepreneur might find these administrative tasks redundant, inefficient, and
costly if she could achieve the same results with one article of organization, one
operating agreement and one state filing. This is the case in Delaware, where the
enabling statute only requires one articles of organization, one operating
agreement, and one filing with the state to establish the SLLC—regardless of
the number of protected series created under the operating agreement.62
Despite the potential savings in cost and administration, the growth in
popularity of the SLLC has struggled to gain momentum. The second state to
follow Delaware’s lead and pass an enabling statute for SLLCs was Oklahoma,

57

§ 18-215(b) (emphasis added).
E.g., § 18-215(a).
59
HUMPHREYS, supra note 9, at § 2.02(5).
60
E.g., § 18-215(b),
61
UNIF. PROTECTED SERIES ACT, Prefatory Note at 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
62
§ 18-215(b) (“Notice in a certificate of formation of the limitation on liabilities of a series . . . shall be
sufficient for all purposes . . . whether or not the limited liability company has established any series . . . .”).
58
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and it did not do so until 2004.63 As of 2017, over twenty years since being
introduced, only fifteen jurisdictions have enacted some form of SLLC
legislation.64
Apparently, the novel structure of the SLLC has proven to be a double-edged
sword. Although there is great appeal in being able to create horizontal limited
liability shields within a single business organization, many wonder if the shields
are robust enough in practice.65 The horizontal liability protections offered by
SLLCs have not been tested in a bankruptcy court, and until they are, concerns
will continue to revolve around which entity is eligible to be a debtor, and the
robustness of the horizontal limited liability shields.
To further exacerbate these concerns, although all series are created from
LLCs,66 the enabling statues vary across jurisdictions. For example, the Illinois
SLLC enabling statute differs from the Delaware SLLC enabling statute in at
least three important ways. First, the Illinois statute requires each series to file a
“certificate of designation” before the series can exist, whereas no such filing is
required in Delaware.67 Second, and as a consequence, Delaware does not
maintain public records for each individual series, whereas Illinois does.68 And
finally, in Illinois a series may obtain a good standing certificate, whereas in
Delaware a series cannot.69 Of the fifteen jurisdictions to date with enacted

63

UNIF. PROTECTED SERIES ACT, Prefatory Note at 5.
Delaware, Oklahoma, Illinois, Nevada, Tennessee, Iowa, Puerto Rico, Texas, District of Columbia,
Kansas, Missouri, Montana, Utah, Alabama, and Indiana. Id.
65
E.g., Bruce H. White, Utah Series LLC—The Risk of Use Continues to be Uncertain, UTAH BAR
JOURNAL, Sept.–Oct. 2016, at 28 (“The author could not recommend a Series LLC . . . too much risk and
ambiguity surround the Series LLC . . . .”).
66
ALA. CODE §§ 10A-5A-11.01 (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215 (2016); D.C. CODE § 29-80206 (2013); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/37-40 (2017); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18.3 & 18.2 (2017); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 489-1201 (2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76, 143 (2017); MO. ANN. STAT. § 347.186 (2013); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 35-8-304 (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.296 (2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2005
(2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-309 (2012); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 101.601 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 48-3a-1201 (2014); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 14, § 3967 (2011).
67
Compare 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/37-40(b) and (d) (“Upon the filing of the certificate of
designation with the Secretary of State setting forth the name of each series with limited liability, the series’
existence shall being . . . .”), with 6 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215(b) (“Notice in a certificate of formation of
the limitation on liabilities of a series . . . shall be sufficient for all purposes . . . whether or not the limited
liability company has established any series . . . .”).
68
See J.L. Griffith & A.R. Gonzales, Series LLCs Part 1—Current Status, Multi-State Issues and
Potential Uniform Liability Company Protected Series Act, TAXES: THE TAX MAG., Oct. 2016, at 68 (Table 1.
Select Series LLC Filing Information).
69
Compare 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/37-40(e) (“A series of a limited liability company will be
deemed to be in good standing as long as the limited liability is in good standing.”), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 18-215(b) (No requirement for a certificate of designation, consequently no public record of the series, and
therefore there is no way for the series to get a certificate of good standing).
64
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SLLC legislation, nine of them do not require a certificate of designation to be
filed.70
The Uniform Law Commission (the “ULC”) adopted UPSA in July of 2017
with the hopes of providing consistency across state lines. After stylistic
revisions, the ULC will present UPSA to each U.S. jurisdiction for passage. The
ULC has done this before with the Uniform Partnership Act (“UPA”) and the
Revised Uniform Partnership Act (“RUPA”), both of which have received
positive adoption from the states.
The ULC identified common characteristics of current SLLC legislation in
its prefatory note accompanying the UPSA. The note states that a SLLC is
comprised of “an identifiable set of assets segregated within a limited liability
company . . . .”71 The assets (i) “comprise a protected series, empowered to
conduct activities in its own name and right;” (ii) “must be identified through
recordkeeping that distinguishes them from assets of the [SLLC] and assets of
any other protected series;” (iii) “are obligated solely to persons asserting claims
pertaining to activities related to the [protected series];” and (iv) “are not
available to persons asserting claims arising from the activities of the [SLLC] or
any other protected series of the company.”72 Members of a SLLC may be
associated with multiple protected series, and the associated members receive
all distributions from the assets and activities of a protected series.73 Finally, in
the event the protected series does not have any associated members, the
distributions go to the SLLC.74
The ULC also distinguished the use of “series” from “protected series,”
noting that while existing legislation was borrowing the word “series” from
statutory trusts and investment companies, “series” has a different meaning with
bonds and corporate stocks.75 To avoid confusion the ULC uses “protected
series” as a term of art in UPSA, which is used “to signal a different meaning
and to call attention to the internal, horizontal shields which are the construct’s
defining characteristic.”76 For these reasons, this Comment will also use
“protected series” as a term of art going forward.

70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Griffith & Gonzales, supra note 68.
UNIF. PROTECTED SERIES ACT, Prefatory Note at 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
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While UPSA has the potential to bring consistency across jurisdictions, if
passed by state legislatures, it does not settle the uncertainty surrounding
protected series. With the uncertainty surrounding SLLCs in bankruptcy, the
SLLC as a viable business structure has received hesitant adoption. But the
benefits of a SLLC are appealing, so just as the LLC’s popularity among
business owners soared after the IRS made a definitive decision on how it would
treat LLCs, this author believes the SLLC’s popularity will gain momentum
once questions surrounding bankruptcy are answered.77
To fill a void in academia, and to provide a bankruptcy litigation framework
for practitioners, this Comment identifies the procedural posture and the
substantive standards for a party of interest to (i) dispute either a SLLC’s or a
protected series’ eligibility for bankruptcy, and (ii) gain access to assets,
protected by horizontal liability shields, by expanding the reach of property of
the estate.
II. ANALYSIS
The remaining portion of this Comment presents a bankruptcy litigation
framework that frames the substantive issues of eligibility and property of the
estate within the appropriate procedural posture. As previously noted,
commentators are divided as to whether a SLLC or its protected series are
eligible for bankruptcy.78 Section III.A of this Comment addresses these
concerns by (i) analyzing SLLC eligibility; (ii) analyzing protected series
eligibility; and (iii) identifying how an interested party may procedurally dispute
eligibility.
Sections III.B and III.C of this Comment turn to the second question
surrounding SLLCs: whether the state-created horizontal limited liability shields
that separate protected series from one another will survive federal bankruptcy.
In answering this question, this Comment identifies two methods that an
interested party in a bankruptcy case may claim property that is within a different
protected series: (i) initiate an adversary proceeding disputing the protected
series’ interest in property, of which there are two different substantive claims;
or (ii) initiate a contested matter where the party in interest moves the court to

77
This premise is based on two notions. First, SLLCs are statutorily the same as LLCs. Second, the IRS
has already taken a stance towards how it will tax protected series. See Series LLCs and Cell Companies, supra
note 54. Because SLLCs are merely LLCs that have carved out separate protected series, the only remaining
uncertainty is how bankruptcy courts will treat protected series.
78
Compare Bahena, supra note 22 (A SLLC cannot be a debtor), with Dawson, supra note 22 (A SLLC
can be a debtor).
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substantively consolidate. Section III.B describes procedural and substantive
issues for the adversary proceedings and section III.C describes the procedural
and substantive issues for the contested matter.
A. Bankruptcy Eligibility
Under the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”), a voluntary bankruptcy petition
may only be filed by a debtor.79 A debtor must be a “person” that “resides or has
a domicile, a place of business, or property in the United States . . . .”80 A
“person” may be an individual, a partnership, or a corporation,81 but this list is
not exhaustive.82 With just a few exceptions, virtually any “person” may be a
debtor under chapter 7.83 A “person” that qualifies as a debtor under chapter 7,
qualifies as a debtor under chapter 11.84 Thus, under the Code, a business may
be considered a person, and furthermore, that person may file for bankruptcy
under chapters 7 or 11.85
The question, then, is what else qualifies as a person under the Code. If the
SLLC or a protected series qualifies as a person, then it can be a debtor in
bankruptcy.
1. The Series Limited Liability Company
Not surprisingly, the Code is silent as to whether a SLLC is a person.86 But
the Code is also silent as to whether an LLC is a person.87 How courts have
treated LLCs in the bankruptcy context provides insight as to how they will treat
a SLLC.

79

11 U.S.C. § 301 (2018).
§ 109.
81
§ 101(41).
82
In re ICLNDS Notes Acquisition, LLC, 259 B.R. 289, 292 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001) (holding that a
limited liability company is a person under the Code).
83
See § 109(b).
84
§ 109(d).
85
See §§ 101(41), 109.
86
§ 101(41).
87
Id.
80
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a. Eligibility
An LLC may file for bankruptcy relief under the Code.88 In the case of In re
ICLNDS Notes Acquisition, LLC (ICLNDS), a case of first impression, the court
was presented with the question of whether an LLC was eligible to file for
bankruptcy.89 The court considered § 101 of the Code, which defines “person,”
in tandem with § 102, the rules of construction for the Code.90 The court
reasoned, “under the rules of construction . . . the use of the term ‘includes’ is
not limiting.”91 The court further reasoned that both partnerships and
corporations are eligible to be debtors and an LLC is a hybrid organization that
borrows characteristics from both.92 Therefore, because “including” is not
limiting and the LLC is “similar enough” to corporations and partnerships, the
court concluded that the LLC “comes within the definition of ‘person’ and is
eligible for protection under the Code.”93
In every jurisdiction with an enabling statute, the protected series is created
within the original LLC structure,94 with the term “SLLC” merely being used as
informal nomenclature that an LLC has at least one protected series. Similarly,
UPSA defines a SLLC as a “limited liability company that has at least one
protected series,”95 and proceeds by saying that the “SLLC” is merely a
shorthand term.96 It further explains that under the same articles of organization:
a limited liability company might:
•

on Day 1, become a series limited liability company by
establishing one or more protected series;

88
In re ICLNDS Notes Acquisition, LLC, 259 B.R. 289, 292 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001) (“ICLNDS”);
accord In re QDN, LLC 363 Fed. Appx. 873, 876 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating LLCs may file for bankruptcy and
citing to ICLNDS with approval).
89
In re ICLNDS Notes Acquisition, LLC, 259 B.R. at 292.
90
Id. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (“the term ‘person’ includes individual, partnership, and corporation,
. . .”) (emphasis added), with § 102(3) (“‘includes’ and ‘including’ are not limiting”).
91
In re ICLNDS Notes Acquisition, LLC, 259 B.R. at 292.
92
Id. at 293.
93
Id.
94
ALA. CODE §§ 10A-5A-11.01 (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215 (2016); D.C. CODE § 29-80206 (2013); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/37-40 (2017); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18.3 & 18.2 (2017); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 489-1201 (2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76, 143 (2017); MO. ANN. STAT. § 347.186 (2013); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 35-8-304 (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.296 (2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2005
(2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-309 (2012); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 101.601 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 48-3a-1201 (2014); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 14, § 3967 (2011).
95
UNIF. PROTECTED SERIES ACT, at § 102(12) cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
96
Id.
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•

on Day 2, cease to be a series limited liability company,
having dissolved, wound up, and terminated all its protected
series; and

•

on Day 3, become a new series limited liability company by
establishing one or more protected series.97

165

In sum, the UPSA and every enabling statute recognize that the SLLC is
merely a convenient term to indicate that an LLC has created one or more
protected series. Thus, the SLLC is statutorily equivalent as an LLC. In light of
the generally accepted principle that the LLC business structure is eligible for
bankruptcy, it is likely that the SLLC is also eligible to be a debtor in bankruptcy.

b. Filing Requirements
Because the SLLC is an LLC, the bankruptcy filing requirements will likely
be the same. Thus, using LLCs in bankruptcy as precedent, the SLLC can
become a debtor under several filing circumstances.
While the general rule would hold that a member of the SLLC can file for
bankruptcy on behalf of the SLLC,98 the operating agreement may have
provisions that limit the authority of members to file for bankruptcy.99 Courts,
however, are split on the issue of whether these limiting provisions are
enforceable.
For example, in DB Capital Holdings LLC (DB Capital Holdings), the court
considered whether an LLC’s operating agreement that expressly prohibited the
entity from filing for bankruptcy was enforceable.100 Even though the court
noted that the limiting provision was introduced as an amendment to appease the
debtor LLC’s main secured creditor,101 it ultimately enforced the limiting
provision.102 To reach its holding, the court recognized the well-established
precedent that a debtor cannot contract with a creditor to waive its right to
bankruptcy relief,103 but distinguished the operating agreement between the

97

UNIF. PROTECTED SERIES ACT § 102(12).
See LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES AND LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS § 4.02(1) (2017) (authority
can be found in the statutory language or through agency theory).
99
See In re DB Capital Holdings LLC, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 6567, at *4–9 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. Dec. 6, 2010).
100
Id. at *6–9.
101
Id. at *3.
102
Id. at *3-9.
103
Id. at *6.
98
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members of the LLC from the “[LLC]’s agreement with third parties to waive
the benefits of bankruptcy.”104
Other courts disagree, holding that operating agreements cannot limit the
member’s ability to file for bankruptcy on behalf of the LLC.105 In In re
Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC (Intervention Energy Holdings), the court
considered a limiting provision in the operating agreement that was very similar
to the provision in DB Capital Holdings.106 In Intervention Energy Holdings,
however, the court reached the opposite conclusion and held the limiting
provision in the operating agreement was void as against public policy.107 It
reasoned that the consent requirement was intended to provide an equity holder
the “ultimate authority to eviscerate the right of that entity to seek federal
bankruptcy relief”108 and explicitly disagreed with the holding in DB Capital
Holdings.109
Even if there is an enforceable limiting provision in the operating agreement,
unsecured creditors may file an involuntary bankruptcy petition under § 303 of
the Code.110 In relevant part, involuntary bankruptcy cases require that the
petition be filed against a “person” that may be a “debtor” under chapter 7 or
11.111 As discussed above, LLCs qualify as a person and a debtor under chapter
7 and 11.112 Therefore, it’s likely that creditors may file an involuntary
bankruptcy petition on behalf of the SLLC.
In conclusion, because the SLLC is an LLC, many of the rules and court
decisions affecting LLCs should directly apply. Thus, members of the SLLC
104

Id.
See In re Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC, 553 B.R. 258, 264 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016).
106
Compare In re Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC, 553 B.R. at 262 (complete bar on members’ ability
to file bankruptcy on behalf of LLC was created to appease secured creditor), with In re DB Capital Holdings
LLC, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 6567, at *2 (the requirement for all members to consent before filing for bankruptcy
constructively gave secured creditor ultimate authority to bar a bankruptcy filing).
107
In re Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC, 553 B.R. at 265–66.
108
Id. at 265. But see In re Squire Court Partners Limited Partnership, 574 B.R. 701, 704 (E.D. Ark. 2017),
appeal filed, National Community Renaissance v. Centerline Credit Enhanced PRN, 2018 WL 654419 (8th Cir.
Jan. 5, 2018). Held the partners had the authority delegated to them in the partnership agreement. Id. at *4–5. In
its decision, the court distinguished the reasoning in In re Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC, stating “[i]t is
one thing for the courts to overrule a creditor that seeks to block a debtor from filing bankruptcy; it is quite
another for the courts to overrule the owners of the entity.” Id. at *5.
109
In re Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC, 553 B.R. at 265 n.25.
110
11 U.S.C. § 303 (involuntary petition may be filed against any “person” that may be a debtor under the
chapter); see Aspen HH Ventures, LLC v. Snowmass, Inc. (In re DB Capital Holdings, LLC), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 82877 (D. Colo. July 28, 2011) (court dismissed a motion by LLC members to dismiss an involuntary
bankruptcy petition filed by creditors).
111
11 U.S.C. § 303(a).
112
See discussion infra section III(A)(1)(a).
105
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should be able to file for bankruptcy on behalf of the SLLC, and creditors of the
SLLC should be able to file for bankruptcy on behalf of the SLLC. However,
the enforceability of provisions that limit a member’s authority to file for
bankruptcy on behalf of the SLLC would likely be jurisdiction specific.
2. The Protected Series
While protected series raise new concerns because they are a different from
LLCs, partnerships, and corporations, this Comment proposes that the analysis
in ICLNDS⎯which turns on whether the entity is a person⎯can also be used to
determine whether a protected series is a person, and consequently debtor
eligibility.

a. Eligibility
Under the rules of construction, the Code gives explicit instruction that the
words “includes” and “including” are not limiting.113 The court’s analysis in
ICLNDS began with the rationale that the term “person” is flexible and may
consist of other entities besides corporations, partnerships, and individuals.114
This application of law is a well settled statutory interpretation of an
unambiguous provision,115 and is directly transferrable to the subject of
protected series. Because the rules of construction dictate that “person” is an
inclusive term, the protected series may be eligible for bankruptcy relief if it
qualifies as a person.
The second element of the analysis in the ICLNDS opinion is whether the
entity is “similar enough” to the explicitly listed entities under the defined term
of “person.”116 The court looked for overlapping characteristics between an LLC
and a corporation, and between an LLC and a partnership.117 Notably, the court
described the LLC as a hybrid between the two, saying the LLC:
has attributes of both a corporation and a partnership but is not
formally characterized as either one. Generally, an LLC offers all of
its members, including any member-manager, limited liability as if

113

11 U.S.C. § 102(3).
See In re ICLNDS Notes Acquisition, LLC, 259 B.R. 289, 293 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001).
115
The court in ICLNDS decided this issue as an issue of first impression. Since its decision, at the time
this Comment was published, no other court has concluded anything to the contrary. But see In re Goerg, 844
F.2d 1562, 1566 (11th Cir. 1988) (concluding the presumption that the definition is not limiting may be
overcome by words of limitation in other Code provisions and legislative history).
116
In re ICLNDS Notes Acquisition, LLC, 259 B.R. at 293.
117
Id.
114
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they were shareholders of a corporation but treats the entity and its
members as a partnership for tax purposes.118

Because of the overlapping characteristics, the court concluded that the LLC was
“similar enough” to partnerships and corporations (both of which qualify as
persons) and that the LLC should also qualify as a person.119
It could further be argued that the court’s “similar enough” conclusion was
attempting to satisfy the canon of ejusdem generis. Reading the definition of
“person” in light of the rules of construction, causes the reader to understand the
definition as open ended, which is similar to a general descriptor following a list
of specific descriptors. Therefore, the court sought to relate the LLC back to the
specific descriptors of partnership and corporation, as the canon of ejusdem
generis would have dictated in a more direct application.
In the context of protected series, the answer to the question of whether they
are “similar enough,” depends on the statutory language of the SLLC legislation
and the rights accorded to the protected series. Currently, every enabling statute
accords protected series separate rights, powers or duties to incur debts and
obligations, and contract with other parties.120 Similarly, corporations may hold
property, incur debt, and contract with third parties.121 The protected series is
also like the partnership because its existence is dependent on the existence of
the SLLC,122 just like a partnership’s existence is dependent on the existence of
its partners.123 Because each enabling statute provides the protected series with
similar attributes of corporations, partnerships, and LLCs, courts may presume
that a protected series qualifies as a person under the Code.
Not all enabling statutes, however, are created equally. In some jurisdictions,
the court should not recognize the protected series as a separate legal entity,
despite the common powers it shares with corporations and partnerships.

118

Id. at 292–93 (quoting Broyhill v. DeLuca (In re DeLuca), 194 B.R. 65, 71 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996)).
Id. at 293.
120
ALA. CODE §§ 10A-5A-11.01–.16 (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215 (2016); D.C. CODE § 29802-06 (2013); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/37-40 (2017); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18.1 (2017); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 489-1201–1206 (2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76, 143 (2017); MO. ANN. STAT. § 347.186 (2013);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-107 (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.296 (2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2005
(2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-309 (2012); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 101.601–622 (2017); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 48-3a-1201 (2014); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 14, § 3967 (2011).
121
FLETCHER, supra note 37.
122
See e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/37–40 (“An [LLC] operating agreement may establish or
provide for the establishment of designated series . . . .”).
123
CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 40, at § 2.3.
119
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A statute’s mere recognition that a protected series has separate “rights,
powers or duties” from the LLC does not necessitate that the protected series
can be the lone party in a litigation dispute.124 In GxG Management LLC v.
Young Bros. and Co., Inc. (GxG Mgmt.), a case of first impression, the court was
faced with a motion by a Delaware SLLC plaintiff to amend the complaint to
add its protected series to the suit.125 The court in GxG Mgmt. first considered
whether a protected series could be a party to the litigation dispute.126 The court
raised the concern that the statute did not “indicate what capacity a [protected]
series of an LLC has, if any, to pursue litigation on its own behalf,” or whether
a protected series could “be regarded as an entity distinct from the LLC from
which it is carved.”127 Although the GxG Mgmt. court raised serious questions
that could substantially impact the benefits of protected series, it ultimately
punted on the issue and found other grounds to deny the motion.128
Six months later the 2006 amendments to the Delaware Limited Liability
Company Act became effective and they explicitly gave protected series the
power and capacity to “sue and be sued.”129
The 2006 amendments to the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act
proved to be a judicially robust improvement and they received a favorable
ruling in 2013.130 In Alphonse v. Arch Bay Holding, LLC (Alphonse), the court
was presented with a complaint against a Delaware SLLC.131 The Alphonse court
considered the issues of the complaint and determined that some of the issues
concerned the defendant’s protected series, not the SLLC itself.132 It further
considered the statutory language of the Delaware SLLC, and noted that a
“[protected] series has the power and capacity to, in its own name, contract, hold
title to assets (including real, personal, and intangible property), grant liens and
security interests, and sue and be sued.”133 With these attributes noted, including
the power to “sue and be sued” in the protected series’ own name, the Alphonse

124
See GxG Mgmt., LLC v. Young Bros. and Co., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12337, at *17 (D. Me.
Feb. 21, 2007).
125
Id. at *17.
126
Id.
127
Id. (emphasis added).
128
GxG Mgmt., LLC v. Young Bros. and Co., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12337, at *17–21.
129
76 Del. Laws 2007, ch. 105 §§ 25, eff. Aug. 1, 2007.
130
See Alphonse v. Arch Bay Holding, LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 822, at *13 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2013),
rev’d, 548 Fed. App’x 979 (5th Cir. 2013), remanded, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163963 (E.D. La. Nov. 24, 2014),
aff’d, 618 F. App’x 765 (5th Cir. 2015).
131
Alphonse v. Arch Bay Holding, LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 822, at *11.
132
Id. at *13–16.
133
Id. (emphasis added).
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court considered the protected series to be a “separate juridical entity,” and
therefore, the claims were “incorrectly addressed” and the court struck them.134
Considering the questions raised by the GxG Mgmt. court, the subsequent
amendments to the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, and the holding
in the Alphonse case, this Comment asserts that if a party cannot be a lone party
in a litigation dispute, then it cannot be a lone debtor in bankruptcy court. There
is an important policy to support this Comment’s position: The Federal
Government’s interest in avoiding vertical disuniformity between federal and
state tribunals. If state law does not recognize a protected series as a separate
juridical entity, then the protected series cannot be a party in any state litigation.
If federal courts, however, were to disregard the state’s position and allow a
protected series to seek relief in a bankruptcy court, or any federal court for that
matter, then the protected series would benefit from rights that it would not
otherwise receive in state court. The result is vertical disuniformity between state
and federal courts.
Thus, this Comment asserts that a protected series must have the power to
sue and be sued, in addition to the other common powers the protected series is
afforded, to be a separate juridical entity and eligible for bankruptcy.135
Some jurisdictions⎯despite having been put on constructive notice by the
decisions in GxG Mgmt. and Alphonse⎯have not been as proactive as Delaware
and do not explicitly grant protected series the power and capacity to “sue and
be sued.”136 Such a continued omission weighs in favor of a conclusion that the
jurisdiction does not intend for the protected series to be considered a separate
juridical entity.
To conclude, if the jurisdiction does not recognize the protected series as a
separate juridical entity, then the protected series should not qualify as a person.
In the ICLNDS decision, the court’s consideration of whether the LLC was
“similar enough” to partnerships and corporations was premised on the
foundational fact that all three were separate juridical entities;137 each having
standing to sue and be sued under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.138 But
how can a protected series be “similar enough” to corporations, partnerships,
and LLCs if it cannot sue and be sued? This Comment asserts that the ability to
134

Id.
See id.; see also GxG Mgmt., LLC v. Young Bros. & Co., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *17–21 (D.
Me. Feb. 21, 2007).
136
E.g., ALA. CODE §§ 10A-5A-11.01–.16 (2015).
137
See In re ICLNDS Notes Acquisition, LLC, 259 B.R. 289, 293 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001).
138
FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b).
135
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sue or be sued is the unspoken underpinning of the “similar enough” analysis.
Removing the ability to sue and be sued causes the “similar enough” analysis to
crumble. A protected series that is not recognized as a separate juridical entity
is not “similar enough” to partnerships and corporations. Therefore, the
protected series cannot qualify as a person, and cannot be a debtor.

b. Filing Requirements
If the protected series qualifies as a person, then the question of who may
file for bankruptcy on behalf of the protected series should be answered by
looking to the enabling statute, the operating agreement, agency law, and the
Code.
All enabling statutes have provisions that the protected series shall have
designated members or managers from the SLLC as a whole.139 Managers of the
protected series can likely file for bankruptcy on the protected series’ behalf by
the authority granted under the jurisdiction’s limited liability company act or
agency common law.140 In most cases, however, the SLLC will have an
operating agreement that supplants the default legislation.141
As previously established, the operating agreement may limit a manager’s
authority to file for bankruptcy on behalf of the LLC,142 which likely also applies
to managers of SLLCs. Turning to protected series, any limiting provision that
is enforceable on the managers of the SLLC will likely be enforceable on those
same managers that have a role in the management of the protected series, since
the protected series is created from the same operating agreement.143 Thus, a
manager of a protected series can likely file for bankruptcy on behalf of the
protected series, so long as the manager’s rights in this regard have not been
limited.

139
ALA. CODE §§ 10A-5A-11.01–.16 (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215 (2016); D.C. CODE § 29802-06 (2013); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/37-40 (2017); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18.1 (2017); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 489-1201–1206 (2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76, 143 (2017); MO. ANN. STAT. § 347.186 (2013);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-107 (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.296 (2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2005
(2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-309 (2012); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 101.601-622 (2017); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 48-3a-1201 (2014); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 14, § 3967 (2011).
139
FLETCHER, supra note 37.
140
See discussion infra section III(A)(1)(b).
141
See LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES AND LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS § 3.01 (2017).
142
See In re DB Capital Holdings, LLC, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 6567 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. Dec. 6, 2010). But
see In re Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC, 553 B.R. 258, 265–66 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016).
143
See GxG Mgmt., LLC v. Young Bros. & Co., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12337, at *17 (D. Me. Feb.
21, 2007); e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215.
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Recall, any creditor can file an involuntary petition so long as the petition is
filed against a “person” that may be a “debtor” under chapter 7 or 11.144 Thus,
creditors may also file for bankruptcy on the protected series’ behalf if it is a
separate juridical entity. The remaining question, then, is whether a SLLC itself
can file a bankruptcy petition on behalf of the protected series. This answer must
be “no” because a SLLC is an LLC, and an LLC cannot file for bankruptcy on
its own—any action the LLC takes must be through its members or managers.145
In sum, if the protected series qualifies as a debtor, then the answer to who
may file for bankruptcy on behalf of the protected series will be found in the
SLLC operating agreement. It’s likely, however, that the protected series’
managers, its creditors, or the managers of the SLLC may file for bankruptcy on
behalf of the protected series.
3. Disputing Eligibility: A Contested Matter
A party disputing a debtor’s eligibility is ultimately seeking to get the
bankruptcy case dismissed, as such, Rule 9014 governs the proceeding.146 Rule
9014 defines the procedure to initiate a contested matter and states that relief
shall be sought by motion.147 Therefore, a party who wishes to dispute a debtor’s
eligibility must initiate a contested matter by filing a motion to dismiss.
The substantive standard to dismiss a chapter 7 case arises under Code
§ 707.148 Section 707 identifies two grounds for dismissal: (a) for cause and (b)
for abuse or bad faith.149 Generally, § 707(b) is used to convert a case from
chapter 7 to chapter 13 if the debtor has the means to pay back its debts with
future income.150 As such, the more relevant provision is § 707(a), which
provides that a chapter 7 case may be dismissed for cause.151 Importantly,
dismissal for cause is discretionary,152 and is limited by the “sound discretion of
the court.”153 The Code does not define “cause” but historically courts have

144

11 U.S.C. § 303(a).
LLCs are not separate legal entities like corporations, instead action taken by an LLC is through its
members and managers. LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES AND LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS § 4.02 (2017).
146
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1017(f)(1).
147
Id. at 9014.
148
11 U.S.C. § 707.
149
See id. (subsection (a) is for cause; subsection (b) outlines what is abusive or filed in bad faith).
150
See § 707(b)(2).
151
§ 707(a).
152
See § 707(a) (“court may dismiss”).
153
In re Nichols, 362 B.R. 88, 93 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
145
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found cause to dismiss a chapter 7 case if the debtor did not satisfy the eligibility
requirements of § 109.154
Turning to chapter 11, the substantive standard to dismiss a case arises under
§ 1112(b)(1), which also allows a party to request the court to dismiss on the
basis of cause.155 Like chapter 7, the failure of an entity to satisfy the eligibility
requirements of § 109 may rise to the level of cause to dismiss the bankruptcy
case.156
Although courts have historically deemed ineligibility under § 109 as
sufficient cause to dismiss a bankruptcy case, a bankruptcy court recently—in
deciding In re Pratola—exercised its discretion not to dismiss or convert a
chapter 13 case when the debtor failed to meet the eligibility requirements of
§ 109 because of debt limits.157 The court’s decision not to dismiss or convert is
an example of what Professors Pardo and Watts have identified as “residual
policymaking authority.”158 The court’s decision was premised on two findings:
(1) dismissal would not “advance the Congressional intent” of the Code; and (2)
dismissal would disserve both the creditors and the estate.159
Nevertheless, the In re Pratola decision can be reconciled with this
framework’s reliance on the general principle that ineligibility is sufficient to
dismiss. First, the court in In re Pratola was deciding a chapter 13 case,160 which
would not apply to a protected series in bankruptcy. Second, the court in In re
Pratola found that dismissal in the instant case would not advance the intent of
the Code’s debt limits.161 In contrast, dismissal of an ineligible protected series
would enhance the objective of the Code’s limiting definition of a person
because the dismissal would remain consistent with the definition’s limitation to
state-defined entities—in other words, the Code’s bar would be consistent with
154
In re Cannon, 376 B.R. 847, 849 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2006) (“[I]neligibility to be a debtor is cause to
dismiss a bankruptcy case under all three Chapters.”). Accord In re Seaman, 340 B.R. 698, 700 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
2006) (dismissal of chapter 7 case because the individual did not satisfy the eligibility requirements of § 109(h));
In re Foldesi Family Land Trust #3, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 2247, *24–27 (Bankr. D. Idaho Feb. 28, 2003)
(dismissal of chapter 7 case because the entity did not satisfy the eligibility requirements of § 109(b)).
155
11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1).
156
In re Bankwest Boulder Indus. Bank, 82 B.R. 559, 561–63 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) (“Cause also
includes, naturally, the failure of [the entity] to qualify as a debtor under Section 109(b) and (d) of the Bankruptcy
Code.”). Accord In re Head, 223 B.R. 648, 651–52 (Bankr. W.D.NY. 1998) (dismissal of chapter 11 case was
appropriate because the entity did not satisfy § 109(a) eligibility requirements).
157
In re Pratola, 578 B.R. 414, 422 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2017).
158
See generally Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy
Administration, 60 UCLA L. REV. 384, 404 (2012).
159
See In re Pratola, 578 B.R. 414, 422 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2017).
160
In re Pratola, 578 B.R. 414.
161
Id.
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the fact that the state does not define the protected series as a separate juridical
entity. Finally, the court in In re Pratola found that keeping the case in chapter
13 would further the best interests of both the estate and creditors, opining that
the “alternatives of dismissal . . . are not favorable to any party in interest.”162
Although relegating the case to state law proceedings may not be in the best
interest of all creditors, a court deciding protected series eligibility on first
impression should refrain from expanding federal bankruptcy jurisdiction
without explicit approval from legislatures. Doing otherwise would result in
vertical disuniformity between state and federal courts.
In conclusion, if a protected series does not have the power to sue and be
sued, it is not a separate juridical entity. Therefore, it is not eligible for
bankruptcy. A party in interest should dispute eligibility by initiating a contested
matter, which is done by filing a motion to dismiss. The substantive standard for
dismissal will either be Code §§ 707(a) or 1112(b)(1). Under either of these
substantive standards, the interested party should assert that ineligibility under
§ 109 is sufficient cause to dismiss the bankruptcy case.
B. Expanding Property of the Estate: An Adversary Proceeding
Even if a court finds a protected series to be eligible for bankruptcy, a party
in interest to the debtor protected series’ bankruptcy may want to seek assets
from a different protected series (or the SLLC itself) to satisfy the debtor
protected series’ obligations. This attack may be predicated on two substantive
grounds.
First, the quid pro quo of limited liability afforded to protected series is
adherence to statutory formalities. Thus, unless the statutory requirements are
met, the SLLC enabling statute does not grant limited liability to protected
series. Statutory requirements include notice to creditors of limited liability, the
proper maintenance of records, and a separate accounting of assets. If one or
more of the statutory requirements are not satisfied, then the protected series’
assets are not protected.
Second, state common law veil piercing doctrines may be extended to show
that a nondebtor protected series is an “alter ego” of a debtor protected series.
Generally, the common law veil piercing doctrine provides a creditor of a
corporation a means to hold a corporation’s shareholders liable if the creditor
can show that the corporation was merely an alter ego of the shareholders. In

162

Id.
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extending this doctrine, an interested party in a debtor protected series’
bankruptcy case would adopt an analogous argument to assert that a nondebtor
protected series is the alter ego of the debtor protected series.
A court will generally not review the merits of any of the aforementioned
substantive grounds on its own accord. Therefore, a party in interest must
properly present these issues to the court. A party disputing the underlying facts
as to whether statutory requirements were satisfied or whether an alter ego
exists, is doing so to ascertain the legal extent of the parties’ interests in property,
with the goal of increasing property of the estate.
A dispute over the extent of a party’s interest in property must be adjudicated
within an adversary proceeding.163 Furthermore, only by filing an adversary
proceeding may an interested party obtain a declaratory judgment regarding its
alleged interest in certain property.164 As such, claims that a nondebtor protected
series failed to earn its statutory benefits, or that it is an alter ego of the debtor
protected series, are adversary proceedings because they are disputing the extent
of an interest in property,165 and an interested party must file a complaint to
commence the action.166 The question of which interested party may file the
complaint (i.e., which party has standing), however, must be answered first.
1. Standing
Code § 541(a)(1) defines property of the estate in a bankruptcy case to
include “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case.”167 Read literally, this provision includes all the
debtor’s assets, but it also means that all “causes of action belonging to the
debtor at the commencement of the bankruptcy case, vest in the bankruptcy
estate upon the filling of a bankruptcy petition.”168 Therefore, because the trustee
is the sole representative of the bankruptcy estate, the only party with standing
to prosecute a cause of action belonging to the estate is the trustee.169 The
trustee’s power is limited, however, to the claims belonging to the debtor, and
therefore, the trustee “has no standing generally to sue third parties on behalf of

163
FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(2); 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 7001.03 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer
eds., 16th ed.).
164
In re DBSI, Inc., 432 B.R. 126 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010).
165
FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(2).
166
Id. at 7003.
167
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
168
Kane v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 535 F.3d 380, 385 (5th Cir. 2008).
169
Id.
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the estate’s creditors.”170 But “[w]hen the trustee does have standing to assert a
debtor’s claim, that standing is exclusive and divests all creditors of the power
to bring the claim.”171 Consequently, a creditor does not have standing if the
trustee does.
Thus, whether a party has standing to bring an action that affects property of
the estate, turns on which claims belong to the trustee and which claims belong
to the creditor—which, in turn, is determined by state law.172
An adversary proceeding, where the claimant asserts that a nondebtor
protected series failed to satisfy its enabling statute requirements, does not result
in a particularized injury to the debtor protected series. Furthermore, the claim
could theoretically be asserted by either the trustee or the creditors. In situations
like this, the Second Circuit has stated, “[i]f a claim is a general one, with no
particularized injury arising from it, and if that claim could be brought by any
creditor of the debtor, the trustee is the proper person to assert the claim, and the
creditors are bound by the outcome of the trustee’s action.”173 Thus, an adversary
proceeding concerning whether statutory requirements were satisfied should be
brought by the trustee, on behalf of the creditors.
In alter ego adversary proceedings, if the debtor corporation could have
brought a veil piercing action before filing for bankruptcy, then the trustee can
while in bankruptcy. States are split as to whether corporations may bring an
alter ego claim against its own shareholders.174 Because parent corporations are
shareholders of their subsidiary corporations, this inquiry is determinative as to
which party has standing to bring the alter ego claim. Furthermore, because the
SLLC-protected-series relationship is analogous to the parent-subsidiary
corporation relationship, state decisions on when a debtor corporation may
initiate an alter ego claim against its shareholders is determinative on when a
debtor protected series may initiate an alter ego claim against the SLLC or a
sister protected series. If the state recognizes an alter ego claim by the debtor
corporation, then the trustee has standing and not the creditors. Alternatively, if
170
Ahcom, Ltd. v. Smeding, 623 F.3d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Smith v. Arthur Andersen Ltd.
Liab. P’ship, 421 F.3d 989, 1002 (9th Cir. 2005)).
171
Id. at 1250 (citing Estate of Spirtos v. One San Bernardino Cty. Superior Court Case, 443 F.3d 1172
(9th Cir. 2006)).
172
Id. (citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54–55 (1979)).
173
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 884 F.2d 688, 701 (2d Cir. 1989).
174
Compare Ahcom, Ltd., 623 F.3d at 1250 (California state law does not support an alter ego claim by a
corporation against its shareholders, therefore trustee cannot bring action), with Kalb, Voorhis & Co. v.
American Fin. Corp., 8 F.3d 130, (2d Cir. 1993) (under Texas law the bankruptcy trustee has exclusive standing
to bring an alter ego claim). See generally Raytheon Co. v. Boccard USA Corp., 369 S.W.3d 626, 630–38 (Tex.
App. 2012) (opinion surveys the various splits among the states).
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the state does not recognize an alter ego claim by the debtor corporation, then
the creditors have standing and not the trustee. The standing inquiry for alter ego
cases is jurisdiction and fact specific, and is ultimately outside the scope of this
Comment, but users of this bankruptcy litigation framework should be aware of
this initial hurdle.
2. Claiming a Protected Series Failed to Satisfy the Statutory Requirements
Because protected series are creations of state law,175 whether the protected
series satisfied its enabling statute’s requirements is a question of state law.
When federal law is not on point, interests defined by state law should be
analyzed under the law of that state.176 Because protected series are legal
manifestations of nonfederal statutes, bankruptcy courts must first look to the
laws of the specific jurisdiction to determine whether the requirements for the
creation and maintenance of protected series have been satisfied.
If the statutory requirements are not met, then the statutory privilege of the
horizontal liability shields were not earned. Statutes vary across jurisdictions,
but the following three elements are common and should serve as a basis for
evaluating this factor of the framework: (i) whether there was adequate notice
of the protected series’ limited liability; (ii) whether the protected series kept
and maintained its records; and (iii) whether the protected series accounted for
its assets and liabilities separately.

a. Was there Adequate Notice of the Protected Series’ Limited
Liability?
In the current landscape, every SLLC statute requires “notice” that a
protected series could exist. Generally, there are two ways a SLLC can provide
notice.
First, in jurisdictions like Delaware, “notice” is deemed to have been given
if “notice of the limitation on liabilities of a [protected] series . . . is set forth in
the certificate of formation of the limited liability company[.]”177 Such notice is
“sufficient for all purposes of this subsection whether or not the limited liability
company has established any [protected] series . . . and there shall be no
requirement that any specific [protected] series of the limited liability company

175
176
177

See e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215(a).
Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215(b).
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be referenced in such notice.”178 Thus, notice of a protected series’ limited
liability can be given before the existence of the protected series itself.
In the alternative, jurisdictions like Illinois require the SLLC to (i) provide
“notice of the limitation on liabilities of a [protected] series” in its articles of
organization; and (ii) file a certificate of designation “for each [protected] series
which is to have limited liability[.]”179 In these jurisdictions, failure to meet
either requirement prohibits satisfactory notice.180
The ULC, in writing UPSA, created a hybrid approach that effectively
mimics the Illinois notice requirement.181 This is achieved in two ways. First, a
SLLC’s existence is automatically tied to the existence of a protected series.182
As explained by the drafters, an LLC becomes a SLLC when it establishes a
protected series, but once all the protected series are dissolved, wound up, and
terminated, then the SLLC automatically reverts to an LLC183 Thus, the first
form of limited liability notice, is constructively provided in the articles of
organization of the LLC. Second, the protected series does not exist until the
LLC files with the Secretary of State a protected series designation and the
Secretary of State deems it effective.184 The effective protected series filing in
tandem with the state’s definition of the powers and limited liability of the
protected series provides the second form of constructive notice.185 Thus, like
the jurisdictions that follow Illinois precedence, UPSA does not grant a protected
series its powers of limited liability until the LLC files a protected series
designation—where notice is constructively provided in the protected series
designation and the LLC articles of organization.
In light of the Illinois and UPSA approach to notice, it seems the Delaware
approach at providing notice is inadequate for at least three reasons. First,
Delaware does not require a separate public filing for a protected series.186
Second, the name of the protected series does not need to include the name of
the SLLC.187 Third, without such requirements, Delaware has no public record
178

Id. (emphasis added).
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/37–40(b) (2017).
180
Id. (“The fact that the articles of organization contain the foregoing notice of the limitation on liabilities
of a series and a certificate of designation for a series is on file in the Office of the Secretary of State shall
constitute notice of such limitation on liabilities of a [protected] series.”).
181
See UNIF. PROTECTED SERIES ACT § 102(12) & § 201(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
182
UNIF. PROTECTED SERIES ACT, at § 102(12) cmt.
183
Id.
184
UNIF. PROTECTED SERIES ACT § 201(b)–(c).
185
See UNIF. PROTECTED SERIES ACT § 104, § 201(b)–(c).
186
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215(b) (2016).
187
See § 18-215.
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of the existence of the protected series. Consequently, the creditor does not have
a reliable or efficient way to search the public record to find any “constructive”
notification.
An interested party could dispute notice on two grounds. First, if the
protected series failed to meet the statutory notice requirements of the applicable
jurisdiction. Second, the claimant might be tempted to invoke an equitable
argument that the notice requirement in jurisdictions like Delaware is inadequate
to creditors.

b. Did the Protected Series Keep and Maintain Proper Records?
Every protected series is required by statute to maintain some form of proper
maintenance of “books and records” relating to itself.188 The language in most
jurisdictions’ enabling statute is either (i) “separate and distinct” records for each
protected series and the SLLC,189 or (ii) “records maintained” for each protected
series.190 Effectively, these requirements are the same.
Without the prerequisite condition of separate “records maintained,” no
limitation on liabilities is recognized.191 The bookkeeping requirement imposed
on protected series appears to be borrowing from corporate formalities.192 This
may be a difficult hurdle for SLLC managers if they are more accustom to the
relaxed formalities of an LLC.193 It makes sense, however, that since protected
series offer limited liability between various business ventures they would
require increased bookkeeping to ensure separateness.
Even if the protected series created separate books at some point in time,
failure to maintain them consistently may be grounds for piercing the horizontal
liability shield. This assertion stems from the contract common law requirement
of consideration. For a contract to be enforceable, there must be consideration:
a bargained-for exchange.194 By way of public policy, this contract principle is
transferable to the context of a protected series in bankruptcy. Enabling statutes
offer protected series a limited liability shield in exchange for its compliance
188
189

Griffith & Gonzales, supra note 68, at 71.
E.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/37-40(b) (2017); see also Griffith & Gonzales, supra note 68, at

71.
190

E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215(b); see also Griffith & Gonzales, supra note 68, at 71.
E.g., § 18-215(b).
192
Cf. DeWitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 686–87 (4th Cir. 1976)
(adherence to corporate formalities used as a factor when disregarding corporate limited liability).
193
Compare Limited Liability Act, DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6 §§ 18-101 to 1109 (2016) with General
Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (2016).
194
2-5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 5.1 (2017).
191
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with statutory requirements—such as separate bookkeeping.195 Without the
“exchange” of separate bookkeeping, the protected series should not receive the
limited liability benefit offered by the SLLC enabling statute. Thus, a protected
series’ failure to keep and maintain separate books provides justification for
courts to grant creditors relief by providing them access to assets of another
protected series.

c. Did the Protected Series Account for its Assets and Liabilities
Separately?
Enabling statutes also require each protected series to account for its assets
separately.196 A separate accounting of each protected series’ assets necessitates
a bar against the commingling of assets between protected series. Thus, a
commingling of assets between protected series results in a failure to meet this
statutory requirement and, consequently, a failure to benefit from horizontal
liability shields.197
The following two cases provide insight into what actions constitute a
commingling of assets. Although the cases are in the context of subsidiary
corporations, their application is appropriate because protected series are similar
to subsidiary corporations in three important ways. First, as subsidiary
corporations are separate entities, protected series are considered separate
entities for asset and liability purposes.198 Second, subsidiary corporations and
protected series provide a vertical limited liability shield that protects the parent
corporation and SLLC, respectively.199 Third, the horizontal limited liability
shields that separate assets and liabilities of one protected series from another
are effectively similar to the fact that assets and liabilities of one subsidiary
corporation are different from those of another subsidiary corporation.200
The opinion from In re Vecco Constr. Indus., Inc. provides a positive
example of what constitutes the “commingling of assets and business
functions.”201 In this case, the court found that the assets of the parent
corporation and its four subsidiary corporations were helplessly commingled
because (i) “no effort [was] undertaken to apportion the assets”; (ii) segregating
195

See e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215(b) (emphasis added).
E.g., id.
197
See e.g., id.
198
See e.g., § 18-215(a) (“series may have separate rights, powers or duties with respect to specified
property or obligations . . . .”).
199
See UNIF. PROTECTED SERIES ACT, Prefatory Note at 7 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
200
See id. at 8.
201
In re Vecco Constr. Indus. Inc., 4 B.R. 407, 410 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
196
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the “assets and liabilities of the individual subsidiaries would be next to
impossible”; and (iii) an attempt in allocating the assets and liabilities would be
“based on arbitrary assumptions and calculated judgment not subject to accurate
analysis and precise accounting.”202
Forming the other guidepost, the court in In re Matter of Gulfco Investment
Co. provides an example of what does not constitute the commingling of
assets.203 The court acknowledged the presence of “overwhelming accounting
difficulties,”204 but continued by saying “[a]lthough the intercompany
transactions were complex, the record does not indicate that the assets of the
entities where hopelessly commingled.”205 Even though the intercompany
transactions were not “documented in order to allow evaluation of the financial
condition of each corporation,” this fact alone was not enough to find a
commingling of assets.206 What most notably demonstrates the presence of
complex transactions, rather than a commingling of assets, is the fact that the
intercompany transactions were not benefiting the subsidiary corporations or
providing financing to others “on arm’s length terms.”207
Based on these two cases, the court must distinguish between the complex
accounting of assets and the complete lack of apportionment.208 As the court in
In re Vecco Constr. Indus., Inc. stated, “[t]he extent to which assets . . . are found
to be hopelessly commingled must necessarily be decided on a case-by-case
basis.”209 Consequently, a fact-finding journey will be required. But there are a
few helpful take-aways: (i) if the protected series did not make an effort to
apportion and segregate assets, then it has failed to meet the statutory
requirement to account for its assets separately;210 (ii) if a protected series’
records were haphazardly kept, but there was no undue benefit gained by a
protected series, then the assets were likely not commingled and therefore the
statutory requirement was satisfied;211 (iii) if a protected series’ records were
haphazardly kept in conjunction with undue benefit to a protected series’ then it

202

Id.
In re Matter of Gulfco Inv. Co., 593 F.2d 921, 928–29 (10th Cir. 1979).
204
Id. at 928.
205
Id. at 929.
206
Id. at 923–24, 929.
207
Id. at 929.
208
Compare In re Matter of Gulfco Inv. Co., 593 F.2d at 929, with In re Vecco Constr. Indus. Inc., 4 B.R.
407, 410 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
209
In re Vecco Constr. Indus. Inc., 4 B.R. at 410.
210
See id.
211
See In re Matter of Gulfco Inv. Co., 593 F.2d at 929.
203

MCELHINNEY COMMENT_PROOFS

182

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

1/14/2019 9:00 AM

[Vol. 35

is likely that the statutory requirement is not satisfied;212 and (iv) the presence
of complex accounting memorializing inter-SLLC transactions between
protected series may still satisfy the statutory burden.213 Thus, when the
protected series fails to account for its assets separately, or actively or
haphazardly commingles assets between protected series, then the court may be
justified in disregarding the horizontal limited liability shield.
3. Claiming a Protected Series is an Alter Ego
As an initial matter, limited liability is generally a term used to signal that a
shareholder is protected from the liabilities incurred by the corporation. States
are the sole creators of limited liability for business entities.214 Because they are
the creators, they have the inherent power to “restrict, condition, or even
disregard limited liability afforded to the interest holders.”215 In some situations,
equitable considerations may justify disregarding limited liability.216 Thus, veil
piercing doctrines are an equitable remedy and their application is governed by
the law of the jurisdiction in which the entity is formed.217
The guiding concept behind piercing the corporate veil is the need to “apply
the preexisting and overarching principle that liability is imposed to reach an
equitable result.”218 Generally, courts pierce in an effort to accomplish any one
of three equitable goals: (1) bringing corporate actors’ behavior into conformity
with a statutory scheme; (2) avoiding constructive fraud or misrepresentation by
shareholders trying to obtain credit; and (3) promoting the bankruptcy principle
of eliminating favoritism among claimants to the cash flows of a firm.219
Traditionally, veil piercing is to be exercised “reluctantly” and
“cautiously.”220 The party asserting an alter ego claim bears the burden of
production.221 For a court to order veil piercing, the court must find that: (i) the
corporation is owned by one or a few individuals; (ii) more than one of the
instrumentality factors are present; and (iii) there is an element of injustice or
212

See id.
See id.
214
See Nicholas G. Karambelas, 1 LTD. LIAB. CO.: L., PRAC. & FORMS § 2.3 (2017).
215
Id.
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
Litchfield Asset Mgmt. Corp. v. Howell, 799 A.2d 298, 312 (Conn. App. 2002) (quoting LiButti v.
U.S., 107 F.3d 110, 119 (2nd Cir. 1997)).
219
ROBERT W. HAMILTON, JONATHAN R. MACEY & DOUGLAS K. MOLL, THE LAW OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS, 224 (12th ed. 2014).
220
DeWitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 683 (4th Cir. 1976).
221
Id.
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fundamental unfairness.222 A significantly dispositive instrumentality factor is
whether the closely-held corporation was “grossly undercapitalized for the
purposes of the corporate undertaking.”223 Other factors include:
failure to observe corporate formalities, non-payment of dividends, the
insolvency of the debtor corporation at the time, siphoning of fund of
the corporation by the dominant stockholder, non-functioning of other
officers or directors, absence of corporate records, and the fact that the
corporation is merely a façade for the operations of the dominant
stockholder or stockholders.224

To conclude that a corporation is an alter ego, the court must find that more than
one of the instrumentality factors are present, that the corporation is closelyheld, and that there is an element of injustice or fundamental unfairness.225
Importantly, although proof of fraud may be sufficient to pierce the corporate
veil, it is not a necessary finding.226
Even though the veil piercing doctrine originated in the context of
corporations, the theories on which it is premised are directly applicable to other
limited liability entities. Many courts have noted that because LLCs reap the
same limited liability benefits of a corporation, they should be subject to the
same treatment as corporations and therefore be subject to the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil.227 In light of this, one treatise has opined, “[t]he term
‘disregard the limited liability protection’ is a broader and more accurate term
because it can be used to apply to any limited liability entity.”228
As previously established in section III.A of this Comment, the SLLC is still
an LLC. Since jurisdictions have applied the veil piercing doctrines to LLCs, it
follows that SLLCs are also susceptible to veil piercing doctrines. It is important
to note, however, that piercing the limited liability of LLCs holds the members
accountable. But, under this litigation framework, a creditor initiating an
adversary proceeding, under an alter ego theory, is not attempting to hold the
protected series’ managers accountable for the outstanding debt; rather the
creditor is attempting to hold a nondebtor protected series under the same SLLC

222

See e.g., id. at 685–87.
Id. at 685.
224
Id. at 686–87 (internal citations omitted).
225
See DeWitt Truck Brokers 540 F.2d at 686–87.
226
See id. at 684.
227
See Westmeyer v. Flynn, 889 N.E.2d 671, 677 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (applying Delaware law); Martin v.
Freeman, 272 P.3d 1182, 1184–85 (Colo. App. 2012).
228
Karambelas, supra note 214 (quoting David Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 371 (1981)).
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accountable. In essence, the creditor is asserting that a nondebtor protected series
is an alter ego of the debtor protected series. Although this type of veil piercing
is different from how veil piercing has been used previously against LLCs, it is
analogous to situations where courts have pierced limited liability shields to hold
one corporation liable for another—most often in the context of a parentsubsidiary relationship.229 Because protected series offer benefits analogous to a
family of corporations, it follows that this type of veil piercing should be
extended to protected series within a SLLC.
C. Substantive Consolidation: A Contested Matter
Finally, the federal common law doctrine of substantive consolidation may
provide justification for a court to disregard the limited liability separating
protected series. Without explicit statutory authorization, bankruptcy courts
have, in the past, consolidated separate legal entities “to reach assets for the
satisfaction of debts of a related [entity].”230 This procedure is known as
“substantive consolidation.”231
Bankruptcy courts assert that their power to substantively consolidate stems
from the equitable powers granted to them under Code § 105.232 Accordingly, it
is a contested matter and an interested party must file a motion to initiate the
court proceeding.233 A party moving for substantive consolidation must provide
adequate notice to the affected parties.234
Substantive consolidation is used as a tool to aggregate the claims against
separate debtors and attach them to the consolidated, sole, survivor.235 This
procedure, however, can have a significant prejudicial effect on unsecured
creditors as it “almost invariably redistributes wealth among the creditors of the

229

See generally, United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
In re Cont’l Vending Mach. Corp., 517 F.2d 997, 1000 (2d Cir. 1975); see generally 2 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.09 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.).
231
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 230.
232
E.g., In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2005).
233
See FED. BANKR. R. P. 9014.
234
See e.g., In re Auto-Train Corp., Inc., 810 F.2d 270, 278–79 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (deciding that required
notice for hearing on consolidation of assets and liabilities of separate estates into one bankruptcy estate has two
elements: notice must be given in such a matter that it is reasonably likely to reach intended audience, and
content of notice must reasonably inform recipient of nature of upcoming proceeding).
235
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 230.
230
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various entities.”236 Therefore, the court should exercise substantive
consolidation sparingly.237
Federal courts sitting in equity have significantly more flexibility in
exercising their powers, but their equitable powers are limited by state law.238
Since substantive consolidation has its genesis in federal common law, and not
explicitly in federal statutory law, it should be applied only if it does not conflict
with state law or if federal policy requires it.239 Thus, an emerging view of
substantive consolidation limits its application to cases where (i) “state law
might find alter ego or instrumentality liability under nonbankruptcy law;” or
(ii) federal interests show that “a melding of assets and liabilities benefits every
creditor and not just a few.”240 As such, even if an interested party fails in its
alter ego adversary proceeding, it may still prevail under a substantive
consolidation contested matter.
While substantive consolidation is commonly applied to two debtor entities,
it may also be used to consolidate a debtor entity with one or more solvent
entities in limited circumstances.241 The trend toward using substantive
consolidation against a nondebtor entity “has its genesis in the increased judicial
recognition of the widespread use of interrelated corporate structures by
subsidiary corporations operating under a parent entity’s corporate umbrella for
tax and business purposes.”242 “Without the check of substantive consolidation,
debtors could insulate money through transfers among inter-company shell
corporations with impunity.”243 This growing trend is particularly useful if a
creditor moves to consolidate the debtor protected series with a solvent protected
series because it will ultimately result in an increase in assets to the property of
the estate and a higher payout to creditors. Thus, this trend effectively gives a

236
See Eastgroup Properties v. S. Motel Assoc., Ltd., 935 F.2d 245, 248 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Drabkin
v. Midland-Ross Corp. (In re Auto-train Corp.), 810 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
237
In re Cont’l Vending Mach. Corp., 517 F.2d 997, 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
238
See Thomas E. Plank, The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 633, 668 (2004)
(“Under the Code, bankruptcy courts are not Article III courts and do not have the full equity powers of Article
III courts.”).
239
See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (holding that federal courts in bankruptcy should
follow state law if federal policy does not require a different result); Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 78 (1938) (“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be
applied in any case is the law of the State.”).
240
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 230 (summarizing the holding in In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d
195 (3d Cir. 2005)).
241
In re Logistics Information Systems, Inc., 432 B.R. 1, 10–11 (D. Mass. 2010).
242
Id. (quoting Eastgroup Properties v. S. Motel Assoc., Ltd., 935 F.2d 245, 249 (11th Cir. 1991)).
243
Id. (quoting In re Bonham, 229 F.3d 750, 764 (9th Cir. 2000)).
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creditor an avenue to increase the property of the estate, even if it did not have
standing to initiate an adversary proceeding.
Whether a movant succeeds in obtaining an order for substantive
consolidation may “be determined by geography as much as logic,” since
jurisdictions are split on when substantive consolidation is appropriate.244 This
Comment will briefly introduce the three most common standards for
determining whether substantive consolidation should be invoked, but it is
beyond the scope of this Comment to assert which standard is appropriate. For
the curious, there is plenty of opinionated academic literature covering the
judicial landscape of substantive consolidation.245
The first standard is an emerging view held by the court of appeals for the
Third Circuit in In re Owens Corning (Owens Corning) that diverges from
precedent and limits the application of substantive consolidation.246 The court in
Owens Corning held that substantive consolidation should be used
“sparingly.”247 It further held that, absent consent, substantive consolidation
may only be used if it is proved that either: (i) in “prepetition [debtor entities]
disregarded separateness so significantly their creditors relied on the breakdown
of entity borders and treated them as one legal entity”;248 or (ii) in “postpetition
[the debtor entities’] assets and liabilities are so scrambled that separating them
is prohibitive and hurts all creditors.”249
The remaining two standards for substantive consolidation were competing
standards that developed before the Owens Corning decision, and are referred to
as the “elements test” and the “balancing test.”250
Under the elements test, the court goes on a fact-finding mission to
determine whether the presence of certain elements justify substantive
consolidation.251 Two sets of elements have emerged. The first set of elements
244

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 230.
E.g., J. Maxwell Tucker, Substantive Consolidation: The Cacophony Continues, 18 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 89 (2010).
246
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 230.
247
In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 208–09 (3d Cir. 2005).
248
Id. at 211. The rationale is “meant to protect in bankruptcy the prepetition expectations of those
creditors.” Id. at 195, n.19 (citing Mary Elisabeth Kors, Altered Egos: Deciphering Substantive Consolidation,
59 U. PITT. L. REV. 381, 419 (1998)).
249
Id. at 211. The rationale is one of practicality “when the entities’ assets and liabilities have been
‘hopelessly commingled.’” Id. at 195, n.20 (quoting In re Gulfco Inv. Corp., 593 F.2d 921, 929 (10th Cir. 1979))
(but stipulating that the position of all creditors should be improved by the consolidation) (citing Kors, supra
note 248 at 417).
250
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 230.
251
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 230.
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is analogous to the elements that are considered when the court entertains
corporate veil piercing.252 Whereas, the second set of elements include:
First, the degree of difficulty in segregating and ascertaining individual
assets and liability. Second, the presence of absence of consolidated
financial statements. Third, the profitability of consolidation at a single
physical location. Fourth, the commingling of assets and business
functions. Fifth, the unity of interests and ownership between the
various corporate entities. Sixth, the existence of parent and
intercorporate guarantees on loans. Seventh, the transfer of assets
without formal observance of corporate formalities.253

Under either set of the elements test, however, “no single element or group of
elements is determinative in the court’s inquiry.”254 Rather, the presence of the
elements is merely a “predicate to substantive consolidation.”255
The determinative question, under the balancing test, is whether “the
possibility of economic prejudice which would result from continued
separateness outweigh[s] the minimal prejudice that consolidation would
cause.”256 But even under the balancing test, the list of elements are not
irrelevant, rather they are “examples of information that may be useful to courts”
charged with deciding whether “consolidation is necessary to avoid some harm
or to realize some benefit.”257
Historically, substantive consolidation has generally occurred between a
debtor corporation and another debtor corporation that is a either a majority
shareholder or a sister corporation of the debtor.258 The substantive
consolidation doctrine has been extended to debtor partnerships and, because of

252
See e.g., In re Tureaud, 45 B.R. 658, 662 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1985) (citing Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177
(10th Cir. 1940); In re Gulfco Inv. Corp., 593 F.2d 921 (10th Cir. 1979)). Such factors include:
Parent corporations owns all or a majority of the capital stock subsidiary; parent corporation and subsidiary have
common directors and officers; parent corporation finances subsidiary; parent corporation is responsible for the
incorporation of the subsidiary; subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital; parent corporation pays salaries or
expenses or losses of subsidiary; subsidiary has substantially no business except with parent corporation or not
assets except those conveyed to it by the parent corporation; parent refers to subsidiary as such or as a department
or division; directors or executives of subsidiary do not act in the interests of the subsidiary, but take directions
from the parent; and the formal legal requirements of the subsidiary as a separate and independent corporation
are not observed.
E.g., In re Tureaud, 45 B.R. at 662.
253
In re Vecco Constr. Indus., Inc. 4 B.R. 407, 410 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
254
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 230.
255
Id.
256
In re Snider Bros., 18 B.R. 230, 234 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982).
257
Eastgroup Properties v. S. Motel Assocs., Ltd., 935 F.2d 245, 250 (11th Cir. 1991).
258
See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 230.
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their limited liability, it is not surprising that courts have applied the doctrine to
LLCs as well.259 Furthermore, it is likely that courts would be willing to extend
substantive consolidation to SLLCs and protected series since the SLLC and the
protected series are similar to partnerships and corporations.
The application of substantive consolidation has traditionally been limited
to “separate legal entities.”260 The fact that a protected series may not be a
separate juridical entity—i.e., lacks the power to sue and be sued—does not
necessitate that it is not a separate legal entity. Statutes are clear that the
protected series (i) may undertake activities in their own name; (ii) may keep
separate books; (iii) may have separate assets and liabilities; and (iv) are only
answerable to their stakeholders.261 The ULC refers to protected series as a
“quasi-distinct legal person,”262 but considering their statutory powers, and the
fact that the IRS will likely recognize them as separate taxable entities,263 it
seems protected series may be considered separate for substantive consolidation
considerations. Thus, this Comment proposes that substantive consolidation can
appropriately be considered regardless of whether the debtor is a protected series
or a SLLC, even if the protected series under the SLLC is not considered a
“separate juridical entity.”
CONCLUSION
Series limited liability companies push the conceptual limits of typical
business entities by providing their members with unparalleled liability
protection in a single business organization. While the SLLC is related to the
traditional LLC and shares the benefits of flow through taxation, the SLLC’s
statutory ability to silo assets and liabilities into protected series parallels the
protections created in a multi-level, parent-subsidiary, corporate structure. The
popularity of the SLLC has dramatically increased from its humble beginning in
1996, but its growth is encumbered by the uncertainty surrounding its
bankruptcy eligibility and the horizontal limited liability shields created by
SLLC statutes.

259
See e.g., FDIC v. Colonial Realty Co., 966 F.2d 57, 60–61 (2d Cir. 1992) (substantive consolidation
between partnership and two debtor individual partners was upheld by court); In re Lodge at Big Sky, LLC, 454
B.R. 138, 143 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2011) (substantive consolidation of two LLCs).
260
See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 205 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Genesis Health Ventures, Inc. v.
Stapleton (In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc.), 402 F.3d 416, 423 (3d Cir. 2005)).
261
See UNIF. PROTECTED SERIES ACT, Prefatory Note at 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
262
See id. at 3.
263
Proposed Regulation 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-1(a)(5).
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The unparalleled limited liability afforded to SLLC’s members raises new
questions of how far a state may go in sheltering a debtor’s liability to creditors.
This Comment responds by offering a bankruptcy litigation framework. The
framework provides practitioners with the procedural posture and substantive
grounds to dispute eligibility and circumvent horizontal limited liability. With
these tools, creditors can further their relief and effectuate the federal bankruptcy
interest in promptly distributing assets among similarly situated creditors, thus,
restoring the equilibrium between federal and state interests.
Bankruptcy eligibility is a contested matter, as such, interested parties may
dispute a protected series’ eligibility by filing a motion. This Comment asserts
that courts will likely find that the Series LLC is eligible for federal bankruptcy
relief. The eligibility of protected series, on the other hand, may depend on the
applicable enabling statute.
The horizontal liability shields may be avoided in two ways. First, the
interested party may seek to increase the property of the estate by swallowing
assets on a sister protected series. Second, the interested party may move for
substantive consolidation.
Disputes over valid interests in property, and consequently over property of
the estate, are governed by adversary proceedings, which are initiated by filing
a complaint. The claimant may dispute property interests on two substantive
grounds. The first is that the nondebtor protected series in question failed to earn
limited liability as a quid pro quo for statutory adherence. The second is that the
nondebtor protected series is an alter ego of the debtor protected series.
Substantive consolidation is grounded in the court’s equitable power and
requires a party to make a motion. Therefore, it is treated as a contested matter.
Substantive consolidation is generally limited between two debtor entities, but
courts have, in limited circumstances, cautiously extended substantive
consolidation to situations where a nondebtor is consolidated with a debtor
entity. Such an application may benefit a creditor of a protected series because
it would ultimately increase the property of the estate.
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In conclusion, even though the Series LLC frustrates a creditor’s ability to
satisfy its claims in bankruptcy, there are still avenues of attack. Using this
bankruptcy litigation framework can provide parties in interest with multiple
avenues to reach relief.
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